Disintegration of the Soviet Union put into motion an informal integration of unofficial religious structures that recognize no frontiers and know no obstacles for interaction. Kyrgyz political scientist Ikbol Mursaitov is convinced that the second wave of Islamic mobilization in under way in Central Asia nowadays. It was sparked by active efforts of law enforcement agencies against illegal Islamic organizations in the region on the one hand, and by socioeconomic insecurity of the region in the light of the latest developments on the other.

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The events of March 24, 2005, and rampant underworld in Kyrgyzstan, the tragedy of Andizhan in Uzbekistan, assassinations of opposition leaders in Kazakhstan - all of that cannot help worrying ordinary citizens of these countries who wonder about their future.

All these factors foment activization of unofficial religious organizations. The outlawed Hizb-ut-Takhrir is particularly active and energetic.

The problem of Hizb-ut-Takhrir in Central Asia is gradually taking shape. These matters were discussed by scientists and politicians alone in 1996-2000, but Hizb-ut-Takhrir is rapidly becoming a political force that is not to be neglected and that is in the opposition to the existing regimes.

Analysis of certain factors corroborates it.

Hizb-ut-Takhrir in Central Asia is no longer a monoethnic religious-political structure. Party activists claim the manpower in excess of 10,000 members and the non-indigenous population accounts for 20% of them (Kyrgyzes, Tatars, Russians, Kurds, Chechens, Meskhetian Turks). The nucleus of the particularly active party members is comprised of Uzbeks from the Ferghana Valley. They are Uzbeks from Osh, Qorasuv, Dzhalalabad, Ferghana, Andizhan, Namangan, Khodzhent, Isfara, Aravan, Batken, and Isfana.

The majority of Hizb-ut-Takhrir activists are aged between 18 and 35. They are young men with secondary, professional, and higher education.

A great deal of politicians and particularly human rights activists believed only recently that the less attention is showered on Hizb-ut-Takhrir by general public, the faster its clout will ebb. It is clear now that Hizb-ut-Takhrir is actively promoting its ideas among the masses through media outlets including Internet.

Hizb-ut-Takhrir is indigenous enough to use different methods of cultivation of its ideas in different regions. Leaflets circulate in all regions but the Hizb-ut-Takhrir cell in this or that area spreads leaflets with information on the state of affairs in other areas and regions. Say, in Kazakhstan the party in its leaflets boasts of the "heroic deeds" of Hizb-ut-Takhrir activists in Uzbekistan and Turkey. Leaflets (actually whole brochures) discovered in Kyrgyzstan were found to contain calls to the people made in the name of Hizb-ut-Takhrir activists "from all over the world".

Whoever studies Hizb-ut-Takhrir is prone to make the traditional mistake of assuming that the party is after "Utopian objectives and tasks" leading to establishment of a "global Moslem caliphate". In the meantime, Hizb-ut-Takhrir may accomplish its mission of establishment of the caliphate step by step, through creation of a "new geopolitical territory" to "promote its own interests." For example, Hizb-ut-Takhrir is not interested in Kyrgyzstan as such. It is after unification of all Central Asia into a subject that will also comprise Afghanistan, East Turkestan, and China.

Monitoring and analysis of Hizb-ut-Takhrir activities lead to the following conclusions.

Hizb-ut-Takhrir ringleaders in cities of the Ferghana Valley train activists for their organizations in other Central Asian regions. They trained men for organizations within the country itself in the early 2000's but nowadays activists are being trained for Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and China. Training is fairly demanding and rigorous. These trainees are known as the mushrif, while the so called nakib were trained in the past. Hizb-ut-Takhrir ringleaders admit that selection into the party is much more thorough now, and candidates are supposed to be well-versed in special literature.

Election of the parliament of Kyrgyzstan proves that Hizb-ut-Takhrir knows better than to nominate its candidates directly. In the meantime, Hizb-ut-Takhrir activists offer their votes in return for certain favors. Candidates for national lawmakers are sometimes compelled to "buy" this votes and guarantee these favors if and when they win.

The situation with election of the president was certainly different. Hizb-ut-Takhrir activists voted for candidate Tursunbai Bakir uulu. According to Hizb-ut-Takhrir ringleaders, mass participation of members of the party in the election proves that its ranks are swelling. They knew their candidate for a loser which he was, but a mass campaign of support of a certain candidate was a kind of rehearsal. Hizb-ut-Takhrir made the first successful attempt to have their candidates elected the heads of village administrations shortly afterwards. Activists of the party were actually elected into village administrations in some districts in southern Kyrgyzstan.

Dilyor Dzhumabayev, one of Qorasuv leaders of Hizb-ut-Takhrir, was arrested in April 2006. The police detained Dzhumabayev for unpaid electricity bills to the amount exceeding $200. Charges under Article 164 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan were pressed against him (embezzlement). His followers are collecting signatures on the petition for Dzhumabayev's release. The locals sign the petition without compunctions because Dzhumabayev has always promoted their interests. Qorasuv population is ready to rise in his defense.

Analysis leads to the conclusion that Hizb-ut-Takhrir has charted a special program of winning sympathies of the population with the party that is allegedly fighting "corruption and the lawless local state officials." The program is being actively implemented. Hizb-ut-Takhrir activists speak up in defense of the rights of users of electric power, assist young families, and organize feasts for common folk in the course of Kurban and Orozo Ait festivities.

Hizb-ut-Takhrir is running some analytical centers that are always in possession of the latest information. The Nilson Center (Washington, DC, United States) has already charted a brochure on "ideological war with Hizb-ut-Takhrir". The brochure has not even reached Central Asia yet, but Hizb-ut-Takhrir activists have already read it and are plan countermeasures now. In other words, Hizb-ut-Takhrir ringleaders and activists are better informed than state structures and law enforcement agencies are. Activists of the party say that they have analytical centers in Osh, Dzhalalabad, Uzgen, Qorasuv (Kyrgyzstan), Khodzhent, Isfar (Tajikistan), Chimkent, Almaty (Kazakhstan).

Principal discord with other schools of Islam notwithstanding, Hizb-ut-Takhrir recognizes other Islamic organizations as brothers in faith. Hizb-ut-Takhrir activists may lend a helping hand to members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or Bajat.

Hizb-ut-Takhrir remains convinced even now that the events of May, 2005, in Andizhan were inspired and orchestrated by secret services themselves (namely by the National Security Committee of Uzbekistan). Its activists abhor mass violence. Not long before the events in Andizhan, leaders of Hizb-ut-Takhrir in Uzbekistan asked their Kyrgyz "colleagues" to join the population of Andizhan. The Kyrgyz organization turned the suggestion down. Hizb-ut-Takhrir is making arrangements for 2007 now, the year of presidential election in Uzbekistan. The party is worried by the suggestions to make Islam Karimov lifetime president that may be heard in the country every now and then. Hizb-ut-Takhrir is convinced that the West will prevent it from happening. What information it possesses convinced Hizb-ut-Takhrir that countries of the West are making preparations for dethroning Karimov in 2007. Opposing Karimov, Hizb-ut-Takhrir sees no leaders in the Uzbek democratic opposition.

The measures against Hizb-ut-Takhrir state structures should take:

1. Left to its own devices, no country can hope to cope with Hizb-ut-Takhrir unassisted. An international analytical center is therefore needed in Central Asia, a center employing a broad spectrum of specialists from scientists to analysts to officers of law enforcement agencies to religious leaders.

2. No stiff legislation may be counted on to do away with Hizb-ut-Takhrir. The party enjoys fairly solid positions in penitentiary facilities in Kyrgyzstan. Imprisoned Hizb-ut-Takhrir members stay in touch with activists beyond prisons and jails, they are regularly informed of all latest developments. Ordinary criminals are brainwashed into becoming sympathizers or even members of Hizb-ut-Takhrir. Political repressions and harassment will only worsen the confrontation and deteriorate the whole situation. The Uzbek experience is not something to be forgotten. Unprecedented pressure applied by the state in Uzbekistan compelled Hizb-ut-Takhrir followers and sympathizers to go underground and join the irreconcilable opposition. Hizb-ut-Takhrir members claim that the ranks of the party in Uzbekistan swell with each passing year.

3. Hizb-ut-Takhrir literature, strategy, tactic, ideology, and methods should be thoroughly studied to make the war on it effective. Once its members' psychology and views are known, plans of ideological war on the party may be charted.

4. The role of the Religious Directorate of Moslems of Kyrgyzstan should be augmented. It can talk to Hizb-ut-Takhrir members and convince them of the erroneousness of their ways. The role of religious schools should be augmented as well.

5. Central Asian countries should pool efforts and chart ideological measures of confronting Hizb-ut-Takhrir in the region.