On the eve of the anniversary of the tragedy in Andijan on May 12, President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov thanked Vladimir Putin for help and said he was prepared to sell extractive industry (oil, gas, gold, uranium) and industrial objects themselves (Tashkent Aircraft Manufacturer and Angren Metal Combine) to Russian businesses. This is apparently the price of the support from Moscow to Tashkent in May-June 2005.

A year ago, on May 12, 2005, several hundreds of residents of Andijan were enraged to hear of the arrests of 24 local businessmen charged with being in an anti-Karimov conspiracy. The protesters seized the local jail and released inmates and took over the local garrison and the administration. Crowds numbering dozens of thousands joined the initial core of the protest. These latter protested against impoverishment and its roots - corruption in the Ferghana Valley where 12,000,000 reside (30% of the population of Uzbekistan). The Uzbek government army and Internal Troops brutally crushed the rebellion by the morning of May 14. According to official reports, 187 peaceful locals were killed, but Human Rights Watch numbers them between 700 and 1,500. The European Union and Washington demanded an impartial investigation but Karimov would not let foreign experts into the country. Thus he crossed out (or was it the sign of the crescent?) the possibility of cooperation with the West.

There can be no doubt that Russia does have a leverage to be used against Uzbekistan. A hint that the Russian pipelines may be made not available for Uzbek gas or Gennadi Onischenko's decision not to use Uzbek cotton anymore because of pesticides will make Tashkent maximum agreeable. The Russian-Uzbek trade turnover amounted to nearly $1.4 billion in 2004, according to the Russian Statistics State Committee, and to almost $1.8 billion in 2005 according to the Customs Service. That amounts to between 15% and 20% of Uzbekistan's foreign trade balance. The second most important trade partner, the United States, accounted for only 6.5% in 2004. Like with Belarus, however, Russia is being thoroughly pragmatic in its relationship with Uzbekistan. For example, it backed official Tashkent when the latter ascribed the revolt in Andijan to Islamic extremists from abroad and not to impoverishment or corruption. As far as the Russian leadership is concerned, the events in Andijan and their investigation are an internal affair of Uzbekistan itself. Uzbek economic assets are a different matter, now.

At first sight, this stand on the matter benefited Russia economically and politically. But have the latter been thoroughly contemplated? It does not even matter that the Presidents of Russia and Uzbekistan met in Sochi on the anniversary of the massacre in Andijan. What counts is that Moscow's assistance enables Tashkent to suppress the opposition. Favorable terms in the world markets enable it to retain the illusion of prosperity without the reforms that would have given jobs to the millions in the Ferghana Valley. Experts predict a social explosion there in 3-4 years unless measures are taken against it, and this explosion may both topple the Uzbek regime and affect nearby countries. Russia will lose its clout with the region in this case. Its support of Karimov, Emomali Rakhmonov, and Saparmurat Niyazov has undermined the faith in the "White Tsar" that could be complained to against the local khans since the late 19th century. The "White Tsar" is the khans' friend now. He buys jewels from them without the slightest attention paid to the sufferings of khans' subjects.

Vedomosti, May 15, 2006, p. A4

© Translated by Ferghana.Ru