Kyrgyzstan: Role and place of ethnic minorities in conflicts between the opposition and the regime
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It was mostly Kyrgyzes - and mostly from the northern regions of the country at that - who participated in the opposition rallies in Bishkek between April 11 and 19. Why were representatives of other ethnic groups absent? (Not one report in the media mentioned their presence.) Are they completely indifferent? Why are the local Russians, Uzbeks, Dungans, and others so apolitical?
The 2001 census estimated the population of Kyrgyzstan at 5 million including 65.7% Kyrgyzes, 13,9% Uzbeks, 11.7% Russians, and all other ethnic groups accounting for less than 9%.
Kyrgyzes alone carried out the Revolution (or putsch, according to others) in March 2005. It began in Jalalabad in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan where they overrun the regional administration. Jalalabad in the meantime is known as a region where Uzbeks account for every second resident. Even so, Uzbeks appeared in the central square only on March 20 when the authorities send the army against the protesters.
The only Uzbek social action organization then, the Uzbek Center of National Culture decided that the Uzbeks shouldn't participate in the rallies of the opposition under Kurmanbek Bakiyev or in the ones arranged by the regime. Uzbek leaders thought, not unreasonably, that the pressure on the Uzbek population would remain unchanged regardless of how the confrontation ended. They were correct. When the new regime was installed and the Uzbeks staged a rally demanding official status for the Uzbek language, the new authorities recalled all old grudges. "Where were you when the March developments were under way?" the Uzbeks were asked. Should Kulov come to power now, history will certainly repeat itself.
A lot of ethnic Uzbeks did not want any official status for their language then, suspecting that it would cause friction with the Kyrgyzes. Neither was the demand backed by deputies of the opposition, allies of Kadyrjan Batyrov. (An Uzbek deputy of the parliament, it was Batyrov who organized the rally for the official status to the Uzbek language simultaneously with the rally of the opposition, on May 27.) Some observers later commented that Batyrov's allies had used him and abandoned the lawmaker just when he needed them.
The rally backfired. Ethnic tension in the region mounted. The "revolutionaries" advised the Uzbeks to forget their demand or "face another Osh" (a reference to the events of 1990 when major Uzbek-Kyrgyz clashes took place in Uzgen and the death toll approached 300 people according to official statistics alone).
Experts maintain that the rallies and certain steps on the part of the authorities split the Kyrgyz Uzbeks. Three social action organizations in Jalalabad speak in their name nowadays: the Navoi Uzbek Society (leader - Kadirjan Batirov), Yangi Asr Jalalabad Municipal Society (Muhiddin Jalalov), and Davr Society (Abdukarim Burhanov). The former is known as opposition to President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the second centrist, the third pro-Bakiyev.
Rallies of the titular nation have reached their peak again. What shall the others do? With all due respect to the opinion of the nearly 80 peoples populating Kyrgyzstan, let us first and foremost consider the opinions of the Uzbeks and Russians as the largest diasporas.
Both diasporas claim that their existence is only recalled during elections or a confrontation between the opposition and the authorities. To be more exact, they are only viewed as voters and not citizens of the country. It is not an exaggeration.
Aware of the dangers inherent in appearance of the ethnic factor in confrontations, the authorities and the opposition are always careful with regard to ethnic minorities. They are doubly careful now, when the north-south confrontation in Kyrgyzstan is clearly deteriorating. Neither the authorities nor the opposition want other ethnic groups involved in the conflict - much less their presence in the corridors of power. (Mass participation of ethnic minorities in rallies will enable them to put forth their own demands including those for equality.)
Unlike the Uzbek, the Russian diaspora in Kyrgyzstan divided into small groups in the 1990's. The recently established Russian Diaspora Institute released a statement on April 17. "This whole conflict is about relations among politicians of the titular nation and therefore does not concern the Russians," it stated and called for neutrality. Not all of the Kyrgyz Russians choose to agree with it.
There is one other difference between the Kyrgyz Russians and Uzbeks. The latter consider themselves indigenous, on a par with Kyrgyzes. Moreover, whenever they contemplate leaving Kyrgyzstan to earn money or settle somewhere else for good, they always think about Russia and not Uzbekistan.
Certain differences in their strategies notwithstanding, all three social action organizations of the Kyrgyz Uzbeks call for abidance by the law. It is understandable. Unlike the Russians, they cannot leave Kyrgyzstan for their native land. It follows that the Uzbeks should find the happy medium of participation in local politics. Few of them doubt that they will have to participate in it whether they themselves want it or not.
Jalalov is convinced that it is wrong for the Uzbeks to keep their distance from political processes in Kyrgyzstan, during crises or in periods of political tranquility. "We are citizens of Kyrgyzstan as much as the Kyrgyzes themselves are. The crisis currently under way is our problem too. We are essentially centrists. We want both the opposition and the authorities to abide by the law," Jalalov said.
"Ultimatums do not work as we could see in the wake of the rally last year [the rally concerning the language status - Ferghana.Ru]," Jalalov's assistant Gulshoda Abdukarimova said. "Convincing the antagonist is always better." Abdukarimova suggests the same tactic for the dialogue between the opposition and the authorities as well.
Sabirjan Mazaitov of Davr essentially agrees with this point of view. "The situation being what it is, however, neutrality on the part of other ethnic groups is not particularly honest as a position. It's like telling others: you guys keep on fighting and we will join whoever gets the upper hand. We must be objective. When the demands of the opposition include whatever we agree with, then we should say so. On the other hand, we disagree with the demand for resignation of the president. Not because Bakiyev is faultless but because it is wrong. What if Tekebayev or Kulov come to power tomorrow? How much time will they be given before a similar demand is put forth?"
Navoi Uzbek Society Vice President Ulugbek Abdusalamov is also convinced that the Uzbeks should always honor the law, including in political conflicts and crises. "Unfortunately, not everybody likes our actions even when we but demand that our constitutional rights be honored," he said.
Neutral or not, what representatives of the Uzbek diaspora are ever quoted in media reports always support the authorities. When the authorities arranged a rally "against the dangerous policy of the Movement For The Worthy Future" on April 7, Jalalabad newspaper Jalolobod Tongi reported participation of "leaders of political parties, representatives of the Kyrgyz Assembly of Peoples, Committee for Revolution, and leaders of the Uzbek societies Davr and Yangi Asr."
What shall be done then when regimes come and go without any changes for the Uzbek diaspora? Most say that the Uzbeks should remain neutral and uninvolved.
That the Kyrgyzes are divided into those from the south and their adversaries from the north is common knowledge. All popular web sites condemn Bakiyev and his team for dumbness and clannish rule. More often, however, they condemn the president for being a Sart i.e. a Southerner.
Uzbeks themselves say that they refuse to be an enemy whose very presence is supposed to consolidate the Kyrgyzes. Being equal citizens of Kyrgyzstan is all they aspire for.
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Pro-Russian experts are surprised that Moscow is not working with the Russian diaspora in Kyrgyzstan which would have earned it certain political dividends. They say that the Russian Diaspora Institute should have been established five years ago. For some reason, however, the Russian Embassy and Consulate were quite passive then. All their activities in Kyrgyzstan were restricted to cultural programs and paperwork.
Certain progress was made only recently. The Russian Diaspora Institute includes four organizations, all of them based in Bishkek. As things stand, Russian organizations in the regions are left to their own devices. This period of tranquility may end soon, but consolidation of Russian organizations is taking too long.
