Experts on Central Asian affairs vividly discuss what is happening in the region, its nature, and potential consequences. Unlike in the 1990s, serious changes are a distinct possibility now.

Tashkent options

Few if any were surprised to hear from the Uzbek authorities that President Islam Karimov is determined to run for president again in the election scheduled for December, 2007. The latest developments, however, prove beyond the shadow of doubt that there are at least several turns the events in this country may take place. Shortage of bread and spiralling food prices are taking place against the background of the preparations to elect Karimov the president. The authorities have already contemplated the rationing of bare necessities and coupon systems. Some journalists assume that it will make it easier for the regime to persuade the population to vote Karimov who will abolish coupons and bring the soaring prices down again.

There is, however, more to the actual state of affairs than what this simple explanation implies. The situation in Uzbek agriculture (and particularly in grain the sector) took a definite turn for the worst this August. Shortage of foodstuffs took the authorities themselves by surprise. In fact, similar processes took place in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan too. In Uzbekistan, however, they were of unmatched magnitude and seriousness.

Nature of sociopolitical systems established in practically all Central Asian countries precludes any more or less profound changes in the upper echelons of state power there in accordance with the internationally accepted practices and standards. Aware of it, most specialists suspect the possibility of the so called nomenclature revolutions in these countries. The events in Andijan in May 2005 made expectation of this turn of events a permanent factor of Central Asian domestic political life.

The steps official Tashkent took to tighten its grip on (and control over) society were accompanied by foreign political maneuvers that impressed most experts and observers as thoroughly inconsistent. The Uzbek leadership found itself in a tight corner. The situation being what it is, replacement of the current leadership with new regimes by way of elections must have been deemed impossible. Something else was needed, and needed fast. Some senior officials of the Uzbek states who regard what is happening as an undeniable crisis enhancing their chances to pull off a successful nomenclature coup may have used this period to prepare for the potentially possible changes. Several options or scripts are possible here.

Script One stipulates frustration of the presidential election by any "technological" means available so as to persuade Karimov to forget about reelection and leave the country for good. Script Two of the essentially same option may be even more dramatic - at least for Karimov himself. Some senior official may be moved into the spotlight, someone who will convince everyone (domestically and abroad) that what is happening is actually "natural" and fine. An official like that will probably be promoted by security structures. Needless to say, the political regime as such will remain unchanged, but foreign political maneuvering and alleged cooperation with the international community will give the new regime at least some time when it can afford to ignore criticism.

There are, however, other options as well. One of them involves the presidential election won by Karimov again and transfer of reigns to somebody else's hands soon afterwards (there are technologies to make sure of it, of course). Karimov's own future meanwhile will depend on the exact method of implementation of this scenario.

Last but not the least, there are radical means like cancellation of elections altogether on the basis of objective or even subjective factors fomented by the developments in the country itself.

Regardless of what option or script is followed, the nature of the developments makes clear that it is but a nomenclature revolution.

«Permanent revolution» in Ashkhabad?

Developments in Turkmenistan are no less dramatic. All expectations for and promises of changes notwithstanding, practically nothing has changed with Saparmurat Niyazov's unexpected demise on December 21, 2006. New President Gurbankuly Berdymuhammedov began his reign with doing away with whoever helped his ascension to the pinnacle of political power in the first place. Once that was accomplished, he set out to put together his own power pyramid. Berdymuhammedov is making active use of the foreign political factor. It is in foreign capitals that he is seeking powerful partners who may help him out with domestic affairs.

No wonder Berdymuhammedov constantly reminded the audience of his readiness and willingness to launch political reforms when on the recent visit to the United States. He even said at the Columbia University ["answering a question from one Peter Zalmayev formerly of the International League for Human Rights"] that he thought ex-foreign ministers Boris Shihmuradov and Batyr Berdyev, arrested and imprisoned nearly five years ago in connection with the alleged attempt on the Turkmenbashi's life on November 25, 2002, were alive. Berdymuhammedov also mentioned the Gadyr Gijesi or Night of Forgiveness (October 9) when a traditional amnesty is declared in Turkmenistan. This is apparently how the new head of the Turkmen state is showing the international community that he is different from his predecessor. As a matter of fact, it is also a gesture to be appreciated domestically. In any case, experts know that Berdymuhammedov's position remain dangerously precarious. It means that stability remains a so far unapproachable dream for Turkmenistan.

Dushanbe redistribution

The situation in Tajikistan nearby appears quite tranquil. President Emomali Rakhmonov (Rakhmon now) did away with his political opponents and even with the associates who he thought were powerful enough to entertain immoderate aspirations. The United Tajik Opposition, the political force to be reckoned with between 1992 and 1997 Dushanbe had finally made peace with, was ousted from political life of the country step by step. The Islamic Revival Party, its core, found itself under intolerable pressure and stopped being a force to be taken into account. Encouraged by this success, the regime launched a similar campaign against all other parties of the opposition.

The Tajik state did what it could to make life hard for true believers. For instance, the authorities banned the wearing of hijabs [traditional shawls] at educational establishments. On the other hand, the Tajik authorities never put Hizb-ut-Takhrir on the list of outlawed organizations the way their counterparts in most CIS countries and practically all Central Asian states did. Fighting the opposition, official Dushanbe set out to ban establishment of political parties on the religious basis which is undeniably a blow at the Islamic Revival Party.

"Religious extremists use religious values as a pretext and justification. Secular authorities make similar use of secular values," Islamic Revival Party leader Muhiddin Kabiri told Ferghana.Ru. "Granted that extremism may disrupt the sociopolitical situation in any country, I'd say our society is strong enough to overcome extremism..."

Corruption in Tajikistan is something else, and so is domesticity in power structures at all levels. The majority of the population barely make ends meet. People are leaving the country en masse to look for menial labor abroad. Prices in Tajikistan are soaring sky-high... and all the authorities care about is doing away with the opposition.

The situation being what it is, personnel shuffles in the corridors of power and dethronement of Rakhmon in a nomenclature revolution become a distinct possibility. Local observers comment that the reigns may be handed over to Hasan Saduloyev, the brother of Rakhmon's wife who controls Orientbank (the largest bank in all of Tajikistan). Since Rakhmon is essentially a president for life in all but official name, the mechanism of delegation of power will be of his own choosing.

Alik Nazarov, Rossiiskiye Vesti, No 33, October 5, 2007. © Translated by Ferghana.Ru